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THE NEUTRALITY OF CHINA
In the December number of The North American Review,
an able legal argument on "The Neutrality of Belgium"
appeared from the pen of Professor A. G. De Lapradelle of
Paris. The argument proves to be an indictment of Germany.
Others may, perhaps, advance an argument which may be an
indictment of both Great Britain and France. Our purpose in
writing, is to make use of the sound legal principles, advanced
by this distinguished Frenchman, to indict Japan for her viola-
tion of the neutrality of China. To discuss the subject, Japan
must suffer criticism.
There is a marked difference between the character of Belgian
neutrality and of Chinese neutrality. Belgium represents what
is known as perpetual neutrality, when the neutral nation
"renounces the right to make war" and is in turn "protected
from all' hostilities." China represents simple or temporary
neutrality, wherein there is less guarantee of protection from
others, while its sovereignty as a state remains intact. In the
case of perpetual neutrality, it is imposed on the neutral state;
in the case of temporary neutrality, it is inherent in every
sovereign state. The rights and duties of neutral states, as
recognized in international law, not only apply to perpetual
neutrality, but also to every non-belligerent state. We desire,
therefore, to apply the ordinary and well-known principles and
laws of neutrality to the situation in China, when Japan
proceeded to wage war on Germany.
Scarcely had war in Europe been declared when the Chinese
government issued regulations for the observance of neutrality, in
accordance with the law of nations. Realizing that the great war-
ring powers of Europe had interests or leased territory in China,
the Chinese government desired two things, that the war be
limited to Europe, and, that if any conflict arose in China
between the warring nations, the neutrality of China might be
respected. To bring this about, negotiations took place between
the foreign ministers chiefly concerned, especially the British
and German. The German representative, knowing that
Tsingtao was open to attack, and thus likely to involve China,
was willing, with the consent of the German governor-general
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at Tsingtao, to consent to three things, first, that the German
squadron remain away from Tsingtao, second, that the small
gun-boat and torpedo boats still in harbor be interned, and,
third, that Tsingtao with the Shantung-railway be placed under
Chinese jurisdiction or be neutralized, until the end of the war.
The German legation also promised to abstain from hostile
operations if Japan remained neutral.
The Chinese government, anxious to avoid danger of complica-
tions, determined upon a policy of equal treatment, namely, that
no obstacle should be placed in the way of belligerent action
within any territory leased to the nations at war, and not
neutralized, that is, to Germany, Great Britain, and France.
Any fighting within these leased territories at Kiaochow, at
Weihaiwei, at Kowloon (opposite Hongkong), and at Kuang-
chowwan, would not be regarded as fighting on Chinese territory;
thus would China's neutrality be preserved.
It can be readily seen that the idea of Tsingtao as a base for
the German squadron, and, as such, becoming a "Menace to
the peace of the Far East," was a mere figment of the brain.
It is also seen, that if war had been limited to European nations,
no harm would have been wrought to China, and her neutrality
in all probability would not have been violated.
China approached both Japan and the United States and asked
them to remain neutral in the Far East. Japan, after some
delay, decided to reject China's proposal, and to yield to Great
Britain's request for aid. The plea was put forward that the
Anglo-Japanese alliance compelled such action. If Great
Britain needed Japan's help on the seas, she did not need it on
Chinese soil. Even if an attack on Tsingtao was found to be
unavoidable, the fighting should have been confined to the leased
territory, going back for more than 30 miles from the shore, a
restriction which the British contingent faithfully observed.
If the alliance forced Japan to enter the war, it should also
have forced her to "preserve the independence and integrity
of China," for which the alliance was ostensibly formed.
Tsingtao, or the larger leased area of Kiaochow, lies on the
south side of the long Shantung promontory. On the north side,
running from east to west, are three ports, Weihaiwei, leased
to Great Britain, Chefoo, a treaty port, and Lungkou, only a
Chinese harbor, but at the time not yet a treaty port. In all
this section of the country, Germany had no railway or other
established interests. The German "sphere of interest" runs
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west of Tsingtao. It should also be noted that Lungkou is on
the side of the Pehchile Gulf opposite Port Arthur, which is
leased to Japan.
Very early in the war Japanese cruisers and transports entered
the harbor of Lungkou and remained there beyond the 24
hours limit, while troops forcibly landed and occupied the town,
and 'later on marched across Chinese territory to the rear of
Tsingtao. The Chinese customs and post offices were takep
possession of, and a military telegraph and railway were stretched
across the country, without regard to the rights of the Chinese
people nd despite repeated protests of the Chinese government.
May we be allowed to quote Professor De Lapradelle:
"Furthermore, to demand of Belgium to allow the German
troops to pass through Belgian territory was not only contrary
to perpetual neutrality, it was contrary to temporary neutrality."
What Japan did was contrary to temporary neutrality; the law
of nations was broken. No western nation apparently regards
the matter as of any consequence.
"The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, on the rights
and duties of neutral states, signed by Germany and Belgium
[by Japan and China], is explicit on this point: 'Art. i. The
territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Art 2. Belligerents
are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions
of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral power.'"
What is a sacred obligation in Europe should be a sacred
obligation in Asia as well, especially since Japan is an honored
ally of Great Britain.
"To ask passage of her troops was for Germany to associate
Belgium with her in the war, to expose her, in the improbable
case of her assenting, to a just punishment by the powers from
such treason to her duties. If the neutrality of Belgium had
been temporary, Germany could not, without forcing her to
enter into an alliance with her, have demanded passage; such a
concession would have been on the part of the neutral state an
act of belligerence." The same principle applies to Japan's
conduct towards China.
The Chinese government barely escaped becoming a belligerent
on Japan's side. Japan forced a passage, and China protested;
this was safe and proper. Following the advice of Dr. Ariga,
the Japanese legal adviser to the Chinese" government, and with
the approval of the British minister, China consented to a war-
zone. The Japanese legal expert cited as precedent the Russo-
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Japanese war, when Manchuria east of the Liao river was made
a war-zone.
China was placed in an awkward position; not more so, per-
haps, than neutral countries in Europe. China had one of three
courses open to her. One was to defend her neutrality, and
resist by force of arms the passage of Japanese soldiers. Such
action would not conflict with international law, for the Hague
Convention of 1907, Article io, says: "The fact of a neutral
power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality
cannot be regarded as a hostile act." Such resistance was what
Belgium made, and in so doing she had the promised help of
Great Britain and France. If China, in resisting Japan, had
looked to Great Britain and France for help, she might have
looked in vain. She might have expected help from Germany,
but in that case the ties between Japan, Great Britain and
France would have been knit the stronger. In fact Japan treated
the rules of the Hague as "A scrap of paper," so far as her
relations with China were concerned. If China had resisted,
Japan would beyond doubt have declared war upon China
as well as on Germany, and China's dangers would have
increased a thousand-fold. She would have suffered, more than
Belgium suffered when she decided to resist Germany. China,
knowing the danger, was wise, therefore, in not adopting the
method of resistance.
A second course to pursue was simply to protest, and to
record her protest for future deliberation and decision. China
was advised to adopt this method, but she was finally persuaded
to adopt another method, namely, that of protesting and also
granting a war-zone. By so doing, she, in accordance with
recognized principles, practically became a belligerent on the
side of Japan as against Germany. The precedent cited from the
Russo-Japanese war was in reality no precedent; the circum-
stances were in no wise the same. In that war, Russian troops
had already for several years occupied southern Manchuria; in
the present case, German troops had never gone outside the
limits of the German leased territory. In the former war,
Russia as well as Japan had agreed to the proposition of a war-
zone; in the present war, Germany had not given her consent,
and was not even consulted. In the former war, the war-zone
was of equal benefit to Russia and to Japan; in the present
case it was to Japan's advantage and to Germany's disadvantage.
Though it now appears from these and other reasons that China
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should never have consented to a war-zone, through which
Japanese troops were permitted to pass, the consent was give n
that conflict with Japan might be avoided. This yielding of
China to Japan's wishes has not been appreciated by Japan;
rather, the leniency has been made a pretext for Japan to assume
the r6le of sovereign on'Chinese soil.
The forced passage of Japanese troops from Lungkou to
Tsingtao was called a "military necessity." The absurdity of
such a claim is readily seen, when one considers that on the
one side were less-than 5,ooo Germans, a poorly-fortified garri-
son, facing Japanese and British men-of-war, with 30,000
Japanese soldiers equipped for action, and the whole Japanese
army within a few hours' call. There was no military necessity,
but only a political necessity to carry out a political strategy for
the occupation of the province of Shantung.
The first violation of China's neutrality was soon followed
by a more pronounced violation. Japanese troups marched out-
side the war-zone, took possession of the railway-station at
Weihsien, to the west of Tsingtao, aid then occupied the entire
railway as far as Tsinanfu and also all the mines worked by the
Germans. The occupation continues. The military guard was
not removed after Tsingtao was captured.
Defenders of Japanese action hold two positions which are
irreconcilable the one to the other. The claim is made that the
railway was a German government-railway, and another claim
is made that the Germans had first violated China's neutrality
by the transport of troops and munitions of war. If the rail-
way belonged to the German government, then the transport of
troops and munitions of war would have been legitimate, and
therefore no infringement of Chinese neutrality.
As a matter of fact the railway has been built and is the
property of a German-Chinese company, incorporated in Ger-
many, just as other companies or syndicates have been incor-
porated in other countries. The railway and mines were
"concessions" granted by the Chinese government through treaty
arrangement with the German government; it was clearly
stipulated that, as in the leased territory of Kiaochow, there were
"no treacherous intentions towards China" on the part -of Ger-
many. The company was a German-Chinese company, a private
and not a government company; the territory through which
it runs is Chinese and neutral territory, over which China's
sovereign rights are retained. By special agreement with the
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Chinese government only Chinese soldiers were to act as railway
guards.
Taking, then, the position that the railway was on Chinese,
not on German, territory, were the Germafis the first to be
guilty of violating China's neutrality? From the outset the
Chinese government determined to make no discrimination
between one belligerent and another in the matter of travel by
land or by sea. If belligerents traveled as civilians, in civilian
dress, and without weapons, the Chinese authorities would
present no objection. Chinese action was one of impartiality,
the essence of neutrality. German action conformed to the
Chinese arrangement just as much as the British, the Russian
and the French, and far more than the Japanese.
With reference to the transport of munitions of war by Ger-
many, no protest was entered at the time by any belligerent,
and China, a neutral power, was under no obligation to lay upon
herself additional burdens, because of war between other nations.
There was, moreover, no question of the Chinese selling contra-
band. If there were aiiy arms transported over neutral terri-
tory, they were already in German possession, and before Japan
declared war. So far as international law has established a clear
principle, seizure by an enemy can only take place "on the high
seas." No enemy thinks of capturing contraband of war on
neutral soil.
Even if China was "liable to penalty," the wrong kind of
penalty was inflicted by Japan, namely, forceful, military occupa-
tion of the Shantung-Railway in neutral territory, and the
refusal to China of the right of management, control and pro-
tection. Japan drove out not only Germany, but China as well.
Continued occupation from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, like continued
occupation from Lungkou to Tsingtao, is a continued infringe-
ment not only of China's neutrality, but of. China's sovereignty,
and this in the face of an alliance guaranteeing China's inde-
pendence and autonomy.
In this additional violation of China's neutrality, Japan made
the same excuse as in the previous case, namely, "military
necessity"; but this was only to conceal her real purpose, that
of political aggression. It was plain that in capturing Tsingtao
there was no need of occupying the railway westward as far
as Tsinanfu. In fact the obligation to defend China's neutrality
or to consult China's wishes carried no weight with Great
Britain's chosen ally, Japan.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is somewhat difficult to understand the feeling of Ameri-
cans regarding the rights of nations and the wrongs done by
one nation to another. Americans seem to condemn Germany
for violating-the neutrality of Belgium, but seem at the same
time to overlook Japan's infringement of China's neutrality.
The length of territory thus violated by Japan in China is twice
the length of that violated by Germany in Belgium. Americans
seem to applaud Great Britain for claiming that her purpose was
to defetnd the weaker nations, and so the neutrality of Belgium,
yet they at the same time seem to countenance her action in
abetting Japan's violation of the neutrality of China. They
pity Belgitim for what she suffers in resisting Germany, but
they do not show even interest in the political misfortunes which
threaten 'China at the hands of Japan, although China has
scrupulously refrained from giving offence or from committing
any act of war. They lament the reported German atrocities in
Belgium, but they practically ignore the good which Germany
has wrought, in missions, in science, in education and in trade,
for the Chinese people. Americans declare that Germany should
pay for the losses she has inflicted on Belgium, but they excuse
the harm, the loss, the encroachment which China continues to
suffer at the hands of Japan, abetted by Great Britain. Does
it mean, then, that Americans regard these questions of 'inter-
national intercourse, not from the standpoint of high principle,
law and justice, but from a standpoint prejudiced by natural
preference?
"If Belgium (China) is now suffering more than any people
has ever suffered, it does not mean that in the mass of legal
institutions that of neutrality is particularly fragile or more
particularly imperfect, but that international law is at this
moment too weak to resist the audacious onslaught of those
powers whose military pride has perverted their sense of right
and whose devouring ambition has corrupted their sense of
justice." How can we hope that the careless unconcern of the
great powers toward the rights of China can fail to bring upon
themselves unlooked-for suffering in the generations yet to
come? Every country professing to believe in international law
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